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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Scott Clifford McAuley appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress.  Mr. McAuley contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress because the police officer’s continued detention of him for purposes of a drug 
investigation after he was medically cleared was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion, and thus violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  The district court should have suppressed the statements Mr. McAuley 
made to the officer, along with the evidence discovered in the subsequent search of his 
vehicle.     
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 On January 11, 2015, at approximately 7:42 p.m., Deputy Garrett Kinnan was 
dispatched to a gas station on a medical call regarding an individual who was 
unresponsive inside a vehicle.  (R., p.6; Tr., p.9, Ls.4-19.)  When Deputy Kinnan arrived 
on scene, he observed an adult male in the driver’s seat of a maroon Oldsmobile which 
was running, and which was lawfully parked in front of a gas station.  (R., p.6; Tr., p.10, 
Ls.3-6, p.11, Ls.6-7.)  The driver of the vehicle—later identified as Mr. McAuley—was 
slumped over in his seat.  (R., p.6.)  Deputy Kinnan knocked on the window of the 
vehicle and observed Mr. McAuley “tossing his head back and forth” with his eyes shut 
“like he was having a bad dream.”  (Tr., p.10, Ls.12-16, p.11, Ls.13-16.)  According to 
Deputy Kinnan, Mr. McAuley “appeared to be asleep or was having what seemed like a 
medical issue since he wouldn’t wake up.”  (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-8.)   
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 Deputy Kinnan called for an ambulance, which arrived shortly after Deputy 
Kinnan woke Mr. McAuley up.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.2-4, 17-20.)  A paramedic asked 
Mr. McAuley where he was and he answered Burns, Oregon.  (R., p.7; Video at 
20:52:20.1)  Mr. McAuley then said he was on his way from Burns, Oregon to South 
Dakota, and had been driving for a day.  (R., p.7.)  Deputy Kinnan asked Mr. McAuley 
for identification and Mr. McAuley provided identification, but said he did not have a 
driver’s license.  (R., p.7; Video at 20:55:12.)  Deputy Kinnan learned from dispatch that 
Mr. McAuley’s driver’s license had been suspended for an insurance violation.  (R., p.7.)  
Deputy Kinnan observed an identification card from the Oregon Department of 
Corrections in Mr. McAuley’s wallet.  (R., p.7.)  Deputy Kinnan asked Mr. McAuley if he 
had been in prison and Mr. McAuley said he had been in prison for “corrosion and 
burglary” and was released “in ‘12 I think.”  (R., p.7; Video at 20:56:00.)  Deputy Kinnan 
questioned Mr. McAuley about drugs and alcohol and Mr. McAuley denied drinking or 
taking drugs or medication.  (Video at 20:50:15-35, 20:52:11-14; R., p.7.)  Mr. McAuley 
said he had been driving for a day and had stopped to sleep.  (Video at 20:53:38-42.)   
 Mr. McAuley signed a refusal for treatment and the paramedics left shortly 
thereafter.  (Video at 20:52:24.)  Deputy Kinnan did not begin writing a ticket for 
Mr. McAuley after the paramedics left, but continued to question Mr. McAuley about 
possible drug use.  Deputy Kinnan testified that he “believed there was [sic] narcotics 
involved.”  (Tr., p.17, Ls.15-21.)  Deputy Kinnan asked Mr. McAuley about his work and 
                                            
1 The State submitted to the district court a video recording of the encounter between 
Deputy Kinnan and Mr. McAuley, which the district court admitted into evidence at the 
suppression hearing.  The record on appeal does not contain a copy of this video 
recording.  Simultaneously with the filing of this brief, Mr. McAuley is filing a Motion to 
Augment the Record to include a copy of this video recording.  
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his travel plans.  (R., pp.8-9.)  Mr. McAuley explained that he was driving the car to his 
brother, who lived in South Dakota, and intended to take a bus back to Oregon.  
(R., p.8.)  At one point, Deputy Kinnan told Mr. McAuley, “I feel like you’re not telling me 
the truth.”  (Video at 21:05:18.)  Deputy Kinnan asked Mr. McAuley if he could search 
the vehicle and Mr. McAuley refused consent.  (R., p.9.; Video at 21:07:09-27.)  Deputy 
Kinnan told Mr. McAuley, “You’re being evasive with my questions” and Mr. McAuley 
responded, “I’m not trying to be.”  (Video at 21:08:04-09.)  Deputy Kinnan asked 
Mr. McAuley if there was anything illegal in his car and he said there was not.  (Video at 
21:08:14-16.)  Deputy Kinnan continued to question Mr. McAuley and told him he was 
going to call for a drug dog.  (R., p.9.)   
 Eleven minutes after Mr. McAuley was medically cleared, Mr. McAuley told 
Deputy Kinnan that he had a small amount of methamphetamine in his vehicle.  (R., p.9; 
Video at 21:09:00-28.)  Mr. McAuley later said there was a shotgun in the trunk.  
(R., p.9; Video at 21:11:28-33.)  After another officer arrived on scene, Deputy Kinnan 
removed Mr. McAuley from the vehicle, handcuffed him, and proceeded to search the 
vehicle.  (R., p.9.)  Deputy Kinnan found methamphetamine in the vehicle and placed 
Mr. McAuley under arrest for possession of methamphetamine.  (R., p.10.)  Deputy 
Kinnan and the other officer then conducted a search of the vehicle and discovered 
multiple weapons.  (R., p.10.)   
 The State filed an Information charging Mr. McAuley with possession of a 
controlled substance, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.25-26.)  The State also alleged that Mr. McAuley was a 
persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514.  (R., p.27.)  
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Mr. McAuley filed a motion to suppress arguing that the statements he made to Deputy 
Kinnan and the incriminating evidence found in his vehicle should be suppressed.  
(R., pp.35-41.)  The State filed an objection to Mr. McAuley’s motion and submitted a 
video recording of a portion of the encounter between Mr. McAuley and Deputy Kinnan.  
(R., pp.45-47, 49-63; see note 1.)  
 The district court held a hearing on Mr. McAuley’s motion, and denied the motion 
for reasons it explained on the record.  (R., pp.64-66.)  The district court found that 
Mr. McAuley was seized after he was medically cleared, but concluded that the seizure 
did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment because Deputy Kinnan had 
probable cause to believe Mr. McAuley was driving without privileges, and had 
reasonable suspicion to believe he was driving under the influence of drugs.  (R., pp.65-
66.)  The district court also found that Mr. McAuley was not in custody when he was 
subjected to prolonged questioning by Deputy Kinnan, and his rights under the Fifth 
Amendment were thus not violated on account of Deputy Kinnan’s failure to advise him 
of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  (R., p.66.) 
 Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. McAuley entered into an 
agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and to admit he was a persistent violator, reserving his right to 
appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.60, Ls.1-4; R., pp.68-78.)  In 
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the other two counts along with an unrelated 
misdemeanor charge, and to recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three 
years fixed.  (Tr., p.57, Ls.11-25; R., p.79.)  The district court accepted Mr. McAuley’s 
plea and sentenced him to a unified term of ten years, with three years fixed, and with a 
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period of retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.80, 85.)  The judgment was entered on 
October 9, 2015, and Mr. McAuley filed a timely notice of appeal on October 27, 2015.  







Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McAuley’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 





Deputy Kinnan initially encountered Mr. McAuley pursuant to his community 
caretaking function to perform a medical check.  During the course of the medical 
check, Deputy Kinnan learned that Mr. McAuley was driving without privileges.  After 
Mr. McAuley was medically cleared, Deputy Kinnan continued to detain Mr. McAuley in 
order to question him about drugs.  The original purpose of the encounter had been 
accomplished and Deputy Kinnan abandoned the driver’s license investigation.  Deputy 
Kinnan did not have reasonable suspicion for a drug investigation and his continued 
questioning of Mr. McAuley about drugs prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention and violated 
his rights under the Fourth Amendment.  The district court should have suppressed the 
statements Mr. McAuley made to Deputy Kinnan and the incriminating evidence found 
in Mr. McAuley’s vehicle.      
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress 
evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated.”  State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 
(2009) (citation omitted).  “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s 
application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial 
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court.”  State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562, 112 P.3d 848, 850 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citations omitted). 
 
C. The Length And Scope Of Mr. McAuley’s Investigatory Detention Was Expanded 
To A Drug Investigation Which Was Unlawful Because It Was Not Supported By 
Reasonable Suspicion 
 
Mr. McAuley acknowledges that Deputy Kinnan encountered him initially 
pursuant to his community caretaking function to perform a medical check.  
Mr. McAuley also acknowledges that, during the course of the medical check, Deputy 
Kinnan learned he was driving without privileges.  When the medical personnel 
departed, Deputy Kinnan could have written Mr. McAuley a ticket for driving without 
privileges or further investigated that offense.  He did not do so.  Instead, Deputy 
Kinnan abandoned the driver’s license investigation and questioned Mr. McAuley at 
length about drugs.2  (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-15.)  The district court correctly found that 
Mr. McAuley was seized at this point.3  (Tr., p.44, Ls.12-19.)  But the district court erred 
in concluding that the seizure was reasonable.  The drug investigation was not 
reasonably related to either the original purpose of the encounter, which was a medical 
check, or to the offense of driving without privileges, and it was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion.   
“An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”  State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted).  A police officer can abandon an investigation 
                                            
2  Mr. McAuley was never cited for driving without privileges.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-15.) 
3 The State acknowledged multiple times that Mr. McAuley was seized at all times 
during his encounter with Deputy Kinnan.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.12-13; p.32, L.15 – p.33, L.2; 
p.34, L.7.) 
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to pursue a new line of inquiry if he has reasonable suspicion supporting the new line of 
inquiry.  See State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, ___,  361 P.3d 1280, 1287 (Ct. App. 2015) 
(“[T]he length and scope of an investigatory detention may be lawfully expanded if there 
exist objective and specific articulable facts that justify suspicion of criminal activity in 
addition to that which prompted the detention.”).  Thus, in State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 
Idaho 609 (Ct. App. 2014), the Court of Appeals concluded “it was entirely reasonable 
for the officer to limit or abandon the impaired driving investigation to pursue the 
investigation of illegal drug activity, as the circumstances supported reasonable 
suspicion of either crime.”  Id. at 617. 
Here, Deputy Kinnan originally encountered Mr. McAuley pursuant to his 
community caretaking function to perform a medical check.  Before that investigation 
was completed, Deputy Kinnan learned that Mr. McAuley was driving without privileges.  
Based on this new information, Deputy Kinnan could have continued to detain 
Mr. McAuley after he was medically cleared in order to write a ticket for driving without 
privileges or further investigate this offense.  But this new information did not provide a 
basis for Deputy Kinnan to question Mr. McAuley for an additional eleven minutes about 
illegal drugs.  A police officer can conduct a drug investigation that prolongs a detention 
only if he has reasonable articulable suspicion that the person detained has committed, 
or is about to commit, a drug crime.  See State v. Bly, 366 P.3d 193, 195 (Ct. App. 
2016).  Deputy Kinnan did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. McAuley 
had committed, or was about to commit, a drug crime. 
“A reasonable suspicion exists when the officer . . . can articulate specific facts 
which, together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify a suspicion 
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that criminal activity is occurring.”  Danney, 153 Idaho at 409-10 (citation omitted).  
“Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality 
of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the detention.”  Bly, 
366 P.3d at 195 (citations omitted).  Deputy Kinnan did not possess reasonable 
suspicion for a drug investigation of Mr. McAuley based on the totality of the 
circumstances known to him at the time the medical personnel departed.  
At the suppression hearing, counsel for Mr. McAuley argued that Deputy Kinnan 
embarked “on a fishing expedition” for drugs supported by “nothing more than a hunch.”  
(Tr., p.30, Ls.5-16.)  This argument is well supported by Deputy Kinnan’s testimony.  
The following exchange took place between the prosecutor and Deputy Kinnan: 
Q. Deputy, after the medical release was signed, did you continue to 
 interview [Mr. McAuley]? 
 




A. Due to the nature of the call and the observations that I’d seen, I 
 felt I had reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was criminal 
 activity going on or had gone one with Mr. McAuley. 
 
Q. And what criminal activity were you investigating? 
 
A. At that time, I—he was suspended, he was driving, he did not have 
 permission to leave the state from his probation officer, and the 
 signs I have seeing [sic] from his behavior, I believed there were 
 narcotics involved. 
 
(Tr., p.17, Ls.7-21.)  The district court asked Deputy Kinnan, “Would you tell me what 
you mean when you say narcotics were involved?”  (Tr., p.23, Ls.7-8.)  Deputy Kinnan 
answered: 
Through my . . . training and experience with . . . dealing with individuals 
who have had a past history with substances or substance abuse, the 
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questioning that—the way he was answering the questions, and how he 
was answering them, and with the . . . facts that the medical staff said, 
yeah, as far as physically not having any injuries, he was—he was clear, 
my training starts to lead me to other things. 
 
In a normal situation . . . when I stop somebody or I address them, there’s 
going to be that nervous behavior, there’s going to be that anxiety, but as 
time goes on, when I talk to them, you see that subside. 
 
The best example I can give is, when you’re driving down the road, and 
you’re doing the speed limit, and you notice a patrol car behind you, a lot 
of people’s immediate reaction is to step on the brake.  But then you 
realize, I—I have nothing to step on the brake for because I’m doing the 
speed limit.  Well, that’s—that anxiety comes down, and you keep driving 
in a normal manner. 
 
When I am interviewing subjects, and through my training when I’m 
interviewing them, the phrasing and the questioning that we ask and what 
we’re looking for, you are waiting for that anxiety to come down, you’re 
waiting for—you’re looking for that.  When that doesn’t, it doesn’t 
necessarily mean narcotics are involved; however, it’s a strong indicator, 
in our training, that something is—isn’t right.  And so, we keep 
questioning. 
 
In this case, with finding out that Mr. McAuley had been there for several 
hours, he had—he was not able to give me a time frame—a real time 
frame on when he left and where he was supposed to be, and where he 
was at, along with—there’s a point in my questioning where I asked him, 
you know, the date he got out of prison.  I’ve also got a detention 
certificate, as a detention officer through Idaho POST.  I’ve had lots of 
contacts with inmates and people who have done prison time. 
 
Everybody who is of a sound mind, that comes out of prison, knows the 
date and time, especially when they do 12 years.  They’ve been waiting 
for that day.  That was just—these are all the indicators that are—that start 
leading me to believe that there’s something else.   
 
(Tr., p.23, L.9 – p.25, L.5.)  The district court then asked Deputy Kennan, “[W]hat were 
you suspicious of?”  (Tr., p.25, Ls.8-9.)  Deputy Kinnan answered: 
My suspicion was—Mr. McAuley did not—just from start to finish, when I 
first started talking to him, it wasn’t—he wasn’t—it—it wasn’t normal.  It 
wasn’t a normal behavior to me.  I—from my training and experience, he 
was impaired.  And I did not smell an odor of an alcoholic beverage 
emitting from the vehicle or from him, so my next—my next step was to 
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find out if there was medications, any kind of narcotics, diabetic.  Those 
were canceled out, one by one, through the medics and through 
questioning him. 
 
(Tr., p.25, Ls.10-20.)  Deputy Kinnan’s testimony at the suppression hearing, quoted 
above, reflects that he questioned Mr. McAuley about drugs because of Mr. McAuley’s 
nervous behavior, the way he was answering questions, and the fact that he could not 
recall the exact date he was released from prison.  These factors did not establish 
reasonable suspicion of drug activity. 
 Our case law makes clear that “[a] nervous demeanor during an encounter with 
law enforcement is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable 
suspicion because it is common for people to exhibit signs of nervousness when 
confronted with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity.”  State v. Neal, No. 
42806, 2016 WL 732550, at *3 (Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2016) (citations omitted).  Also of 
limited significance is the fact that Deputy Kinnan did not like Mr. McAuley’s answers to 
his questions and could not recall the exact date he was released from prison.  These 
factors do not establish reasonable suspicion for a drug investigation either alone or 
considered together.  See Bly, 366 P.3d at 196 (noting that “otherwise innocent acts, 
when considered together, can be sufficiently suspicious so as to justify an investigative 
detention”).   
 In Neal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the factors known to a police officer, 
which were “nervousness, attire, and the time of day” along with Mr. Neal’s refusal to 
consent to a search, did not establish reasonable suspicion, and instead reflected only a 
“‘hunch’ that something was out of the ordinary.”  2016 WL 732550, at *4.  Similarly, in 
Bly, the Court of Appeals concluded a police officer lacked reasonable suspicion for an 
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investigative detention where, among other things, “beyond generally stating that 
[Ms. Bly’s] behavior in accessing the car was ‘strange or suspicious,’ the officer did not 
articulate any basis to support a reasonable inference that she had either committed, or 
was about to commit, a crime.”  366 P.3d at 196.  Here, Deputy Kinnan thought 
Mr. McAuley was suspicious because he was nervous, did not provide clear answers to 
all of Deputy Kinnan’s questions, and could not recall the exact date he was released 
from prison four years earlier.  These factors do not reflect anything out of the ordinary, 
especially considering the fact that Mr. McAuley was woken up by a police officer after 
taking a break from a long drive to sleep in his car.   Deputy Kinnan had a hunch that 
Mr. McAuley was somehow involved with illegal drugs, and a hunch is simply not 
enough.  See id. at 195 (stating reasonable suspicion “requires more than a mere 
hunch”). 
In State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647 (Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the continued detention of a driver and his passengers for 60 to 90 
seconds after the original purpose for the detention was accomplished was unlawful, 
and that the consent to search given during the illegal detention was ineffective.  Id. at 
652.  The Court noted that “[a]n individual ‘may not be detained even momentarily 
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so.’”  Id. at 651 (quoting Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)).  In the present case, Mr. McAuley was detained for 
approximately eleven minutes after he was medically cleared and after Deputy Kinnan 
had abandoned the driver’s license investigation.  Deputy Kinnan’s detention of 
Mr. McAuley for a drug investigation was not supported by reasonable suspicion of drug 




Mr. McAuley respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse 
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 12th day of April, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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